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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871 VERSUS THE
ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE: THE NEED
FOR A FEDERAL FORUM
In recent years, much litigation has been initiated in the federal dis-
trict courts by persons seeking to enjoin threatened or pending state
prosecutions. The success of such actions has to a large extent depended
on the attitude of the particular federal court toward two potentially
conflicting policies-the protection and vindication of individual rights
and the maintenance of an orderly federal system. The Supreme Court
has avoided laying down specific guidelines for the lower courts to fol-
low. It is the purpose of this note to examine the origin and history of
this litigation and those factors which have contributed to the conflicting
results in the lower courts. The note concentrates on injunctions to stay
pending prosecutions, analyzing recent cases in the area and the relative
validity of the policy considerations presented by the courts and com-
mentators.
Federal courts historically have been reluctant to issue injunctive relief
to block state court proceedings. Several discretionary theories underlie
this reluctance, all of which are related to the concept of federalism.
First, the doctrine of comity is a policy of non-interference between the
state and federal courts. It is not based on any constitutional provision
but has evolved from the common law.1 Secondly, the abstention doc-
trine, first announced in Railroad Commission v. Pullman,2 commands
that substantial constitutional questions should not be decided by the
federal court if the case is capable of termination by a state court ruling.
This doctrine was designed to avoid needless conflicts between the two
court systems and to insure a "scrupulous regard for the rightful inde-
pendence of the state governments and for the smooth working of the
federal judiciary. ' 3 Thirdly, traditional rules of equity require that
I. Comity has been defined as follows: "[N]o court should interpose its process to take out of
the hands of another coordinate court a res or cause of which the latter had taken prior jurisdic-
tion." Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 349 (1930). See also
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1949).
2. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
3. See Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943); but see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964). Wright considers it more precise to refer to "'abstention doctrines" rather than "abstention
doctrine;" he finds at least four lines of cases which, though they overlap, may be distinguished.
C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970).
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equity courts not interfere with court proceedings, especially criminal
prosecutions, unless the moving party is without an adequate remedy at
law. Ex Parte Young,4 a landmark case, established the availability of
federal court intervention, but only after a showing of an inadequate
remedy at law and irreparable injury.
Whether stated as comity, abstention, or traditional rules of equity,'
the federal courts have been expressing a judicial attitude that interfer-
ence with the administration of justice in the states is contrary to the
maintenance of two independent court systems. This attitude is reflected
in the 1942 case of Douglas v. City of Jeanette,' in which the Jehovah's
Witnesses sought to enjoin a threatened state prosecution for distribut-
ing pamphlets in violation of a city ordinance which they alleged was
unconstitutional as applied. The Supreme Court refused to intervene,
stating: "The arrest by the federal court of the processes of the criminal
law within the states . . . . are to be supported only on a showing of
danger of irreparable injury, both great and immediate. ' ' 7 The rationale
behind the Court's refusal to authorize intervention was that "the law-
fulness or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which the
prosecution is based may be determined as readily in the criminal case
as in a suit for an injunction." ' The Douglas opinion represented the
state of the law until Dombrowski v. Pfister' in 1965.
In Dombrowski, plaintiffs were persons active in securing civil rights
for Negroes in the South. Threatened by state officials with prosecu-
tions, they brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 alleging that the state
statute was unconstitutional on its face and that the threats to enforce
this statute were made solely to harass and discourage plaintiffs' exercise
of their first amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed the district
4. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
5. It has been said of these obstacles collectively: "Factually the criteria are intimately related.
What will satisfy one requirement will often satisfy the rest. The courts are not precise in defining
or distinguishing among them." Note, Federal Injunctions Against State Criminal Proceedings, 4
STAN. L. REV. 381, 384 (1952).
6. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
7. Id. at 163-164.
8. Id. at 163.
9. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to deprivation of any, rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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court's dismissal" and remanded the cause for the framing of injunctive
relief. It found that a normal defense of the state charges would not
adequately vindicate petitioners' constitutional rights because the prose-
cution itself would result in a "chilling effect" on first amendment
rights, irrespective of the ultimate outcome. In addition, the petitioners'
allegations of bad faith enforcement, if true, would state a sufficient
claim for relief notwithstanding any interpretation of the statute by the
state court.'" Finally, the Court asserted that abstention is inappropriate
in first amendment cases when a statute is justifiably attacked on its face
as being vague and overbroad."3
Dombrowski is similar to Douglas in that both cases involved an
injunction to stay threatened state court proceedings which allegedly
infringed upon petitioners' first amendment rights.14 The Court attri-
butes the different result to three considerations: (1) the statute in
Douglas was attacked as being unconstitutional as applied, not on its
face;' 5 (2) there was no need for an injunction in Douglas as the statute
was ruled unconstitutional in a separate suit decided the same day;" and
(3) there were no allegations of bad faith or harassment in the Douglas
case. It is unclear whether the Court found the bad faith and harassment
aspect in Dombrowski the determinative factor, or whether the chilling
effect on first amendment rights was sufficient by itself. Nevertheless,
the Dombrowski decision reflected a new responsiveness on the part of
the Court to the need for federal court intervention. As a result,
II. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964) (The district court would not
determine the constitutionality of The Louisiana Communist Propaganda Control Law in advance
of appropriate proceedings in the state court).
12. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, defines bad faith enforcement as the threatened
and/or actual prosecution "without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage appel-
lants' civil rights activities." 380 U.S. at 490.
13. 380 U.S. at 489-90. The only limits apparently placed upon injunctive relief by the Court
would exist when petitioner's conduct is "hard-core" and would be prohibited under any construc-
tion of the statute, or when the statute is capable of an acceptable construction in a single prosecu-
tion. Id. at 491-92.
14. The question of federal intervention arises in first amendment situations because ".
freedom of expression must be regarded as the most important of all constitutional guarantees and
is entitled to 'super' protection by the Court." Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State
Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. Rav. 535, 554 (1970). Cf. New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) and Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283,
289-90 (5th Cir. 1969).
15. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,489-90 (1965).
16. Id. at 485. The statute in Douglas was ruled unconstitutional in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
Vol. 1971: 625]
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Dombrowski became the basis for much litigation in the civil rights area,
and at the same time became the source of much confusion within the
lower federal courts.
The first conflict resulted from the lower courts' efforts to define the
circumstances which justified federal intervention under Dombrowski.
Many courts interpreted the decision to permit intervention when there
was a threatened prosecution instituted either in bad faith or under a
statute alleged to be unconstitutional on its face. 7 Other courts failed
to find this disjunctive aspect in Dombrowski and always required bad
faith enforcement.18
While Dombrowski involved a threatened prosecution, a second con-
flict generated by the case was its possible application to a pending state
prosecution. It has been argued that a stricter test must be met to enjoin
pending prosecutions since the petitioner is entitled to an immediate
adjudication of his constitutional claim in the state proceeding, while a
petitioner merely threatened with state prosecution has no assurance that
his constitutional allegation will ever be adjudicated. 9 The Supreme
Court has now apparently settled this question by its decision in
Younger v. Harris,2" in which it set out the requirements for federal
equitable relief in a pending prosecution case.
Petitioner Harris, indicted under the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act, 21 sought to enjoin his prosecution under § 1983 and the
Dombrowski rationale. The federal district court held the statute void
for vagueness and overbreadth and enjoined the district attorney from
17. See Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968); Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer,
306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Straut v. Calissi, 293 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1968); Cambist
Films, Inc. v. State of Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185, 189 (N.D. I1. 1968); Landry v. Daley, 288 F.
Supp. 200 (N.D. 111. 1968), revdsub. nom., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Baker v. Binder,
274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967). All cases recognized a "disjunctive aspect" in Dombrowski.
18. See, e.g., Wells v. Hand, 238 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1965), affd sub. nora., Wells v.
Reynolds, 382 U.S. 39 (1965); Zwickerv. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967), affd, 391 U.S.
353 (1968); Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), affd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968);
Samuels v. Mackell, 288 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Fernandez v.
Mackell, 288 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)affd401 U.S. 66 (1971).
19. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 56-57 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). For a
critique of this distinction see Note, Federal Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings, 4 STAN.
L. REV. 381, 386-91 (1952). See'also Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief. A Counterpoise Against the
Use of State Criminal Prosecutions Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional
Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51 (1967); Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against
State Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERs L. REV. 92, 124-129 (1966),
20. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
21. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400 & 11401 (1953).
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proceeding with the prosecution. 22 On appeal,2 the Supreme Court
reversed, finding that "federal intervention is inappropriate solely on the
basis of a showing that the statute on its face abridges first amendment
rights.1 24 The Court found that a prosecution under a state statute
unconstitutional on its face did not constitute irreparable injury, but
only the same injury incidental to every criminal prosecution.
Having thus rejected one element of the Dombrowski test for pending
prosecution cases, the Court established a new disjunctive test, requiring
either bad faith on the part of state officials in initiating the prosecution,
or other "extraordinary circumstances", such as a statute which is "fla-
grantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in
every clause, sentence, and paragraph and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it."'
22. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
23. The basis for the direct appeal to the Supreme Court is 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
24. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
Justice Douglas dissented in Younger, stating that "[t]he special circumstances when federal
intervention . . . is permissable are not restricted to bad faith on the part of state officials or the
threat of multiple prosecution . . . [but] also exist where for any reason the state statute being
enforced is unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 59 (dissenting opinion).
One concurring opinion in Younger stated that federal intervention was improper because peti-
tioner's constitutional claims could be adequately adjudicated in the state criminal proceedings. The
opinion rejected the conclusion of the lower court that Harris had raised his constitutional claims
in the state courts through motions to dismiss and for a writ of prohibition, both of which were
rejected. It did not consider these modes to be within the "exhaustion of state remedies" doctrine.
Id. at 57 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The other concurring opinion reiterates the majority's holding, and emphasizes that its decision
only applies when federal courts are asked "to intervene in a criminal prosecution which is contem-
poraneously pending in a state court." Id. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring).
In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), decided the same day as Younger, the court decided
a distinct but similar issue, declaratory judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). In Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), the Supreme Court had held that the issues of injunctive relief and
declaratory relief must be considered independently; although "exceptional circumstances" are
neoessary for injunctive relief, the Court held that they are not necessary for declaratory judgments.
In Samuels, the Court found that "the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should be
judged by essentially the same standards." 401 U.S. at 72. The Court based this conclusion on two
grounds: (1) a declaratory judgment issued while state proceedings are pending might serve as the
basis for a subsequent injunction against those proceedings to "effectuate the court's judgment"
under 28 U.S.C. § 2283; and (2) the declaratory relief would have virtually the same impact as a
formally instituted injunction. The Court relied in Samuels on a long line of cases dealing with state
tax collection, and stated that it can "perceive no relevant differences" between those cases and
cases involving state criminal proceedings. However, Dombrowski and Zwickler both expressly
referred to state criminal statutes which affected first amendment rights.
The Court in Younger distinguished Zwickler on the ground that in Zwickler no state proceeding
was pending at the time jurisdiction attached in the federal court. 401 U.S. at 57 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
25. Id. at 53-54, citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
Vol. 1971: 625]
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Because Harris failed to prove either of the two elements needed to
establish federal equitable relief, the Court was not required to deal with
the second issue that arises in pending prosecution cases: is the federal
anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, a bar to injunctions sought
under § 1983 to stay state court proceedings? Section 2283 provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceed-
ings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgment. 6
The significant difference in the approach taken in threatened prosecu-
tion cases as opposed to pending prosecution actions stems from the
statutory language. In the forner, the federal court need only determine
whether the requirements for/equitable relief have been met. If the peti-
tioner satisfies the standards,' the injunction will be granted. In disposing
of an action to enjoin a pending state prosecution, the court's task is
two-fold: to determine whether the test for equitable relief has been
satisfied and to consider whether § 2283 bars relief.27
Although the Court in Younger set out the test for equitable relief in
a pending prosecution case, it still has not resolved the question of
whether § 1983 is an express exception to § 2283.28 This lack of guid-
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970); it has long been the subject of debate whether § 2283 is an
absolute prohibition or merely a legislative expression of comity. Compare Sheridan v. Garrison,
415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding § 2283 a statutory enactment of comity) with Atlantic C.
Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) (rejecting the Sheridan interpretation
and finding § 2283 a clear-cut prohibition). For another interpretation of the relationship of comity
and § 2283 see Duke v. Texas, 327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 197 1).
27. When dealing with § 2283 and § 1983, the issue has always been whether § 1983 is an
"express exception" to § 2283. The reasons that § 1983 is not considered under the other two
exceptions to § 2283 are that there is generally no need for an injunction against prosecutions "in
aid of its jurisdiction" and there is no prior federal judgment to "protect or effectuate". See Baines
v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965); Honey v.
Goodman, 432 F.2d 333, 346 (6th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion); Note, Incompatibility-The
Touchstone of Section 2283"s Express Authorization Exception, 50 VA. L. REv. 1404 (1964).
28. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, went beyond the majority and concurring opinion by conclud-
ing unconditionally that § 1983 is an express exception to § 2283, citing Honey v. Goodman, 432
F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970). Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 62 (dissenting opinion).
Other cases in which the Supreme Court has avoided the issue are: Bukulich v. Jury Commis-
sioner of Green County, 394 U.S. 97, 99 n.2 (1969); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 614 n. 3
(1968); Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2
(1965); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965);
Wojcik v. Palmer, 318 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963); Brooks v. Briley,
274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'dper curiam, 391 U.S. 361 (1968).
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ance on the part of the Court has resulted in conflicting decisions in the
lower federal courts.2 9
An evaluation of the lower court decisions on this question necessi-
tates consideration of the history and purpose of § 2283 and the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the statute. The statute was enacted in
1793 to limit the power of the federal courts and to avoid friction be-
tween the two independent court systems.3 A number of exceptions were
subsequently established, five of which were statutory. 31 Only one of
them was specifically referred to in the anti-injunction statute.32 The
other exceptions made reference to stays of state court proceedings3 or
to stays of any court proceedings. 34 In addition, there were several judi-
cially created exceptions.3 In 1941, the Supreme Court, in Toucey v.
29. See note 47 infra.
The lower courts, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris and its companion
cases, had anticipated that these cases would resolve the conflict. See, e.g., Honey v. Goodman,
432 F.2d 333, 345 (6th Cir. 1970); "Although the complete answer may require congressional action
to clarify the relationship between §§ 1983 and 2283, the Supreme Court can definitely decide the
question in the cases now before it." See also C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 208 (2d
ed. 1970).
30. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); but see C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 177-78 (2d ed. 1970). The statute as first enacted provided:
nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state
Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335.
31. (1) The Bankruptcy Act, I1 U.S.C. § 29 (a) (1970); (2) The Federal Removal Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450 (1970); (3) The Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970); (4) The Ship-
owners Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); and (5) The Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act,
11 U.S.C. § 203(s)(2) (1970); See Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
32. The anti-injunction statute was first revised in 1911 to read:
The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay
proceedings in any court of a state, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized
by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.
28 U.S.C. § 379 (1911). The present anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), does not
specifically refer to the bankruptcy exception. For the current status of that exception, see 11
U.S.C. § 29(a) (1970).
33. The Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970); The Federal Removal Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1441-1450 (1970). Since 1941, a sixth statutory exception has been recognized, The
Federal Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1964), which also refers specifically to "state"
court proceedings.
34. The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1970); The Shipowners Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1970); The Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act, 11 U.S.C. § 203 (s)(2) (1970).
35. One exception was the so-called "res cases", which held that the anti-injunction statute did
not preclude a federal injunction against state court proceedings which seek to interfere with
property in the custody of the federal court. See, e.g., Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St.
Elevated R.R. 177 U.S. 51 (1900); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
Another exception was an injunction to enjoin litigants from enforcing judgments fraudulently
Vol. 1971: 6251
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New York Life Insurance Co., 3' held that federal courts may not enjoin
state courts from adjudicating previous federal judgments which were res
judicata to the states. Justice Frankfurter, in the majority opinion, made
it clear that exceptions were not to be carved out of the anti-injunction
statute by the judiciary and that the statute should be strictly construed
as a mandate from Congress prohibiting any interference with the state
courts by the federal courts. 37 He found only one judicial exception-the
so-called "res cases"-to be contained in the statute and found the
others to be "sporadic, ill-considered decisions [which] cannot be held
to have imbedded in our law a doctrine which so patently violates the
express prohibition of Congress. ' '38
In 1948, allegedly to "return the law to its status prior to Toucey,' '3
Congress enacted the statute in its present form. It is doubtful whether
this purpose has been realized, as the exceptions provided for in the
statute do not correspond to those previously recognized: "It is not clear
whether the statute preserves all the pre-Toucey exceptions, nor is it clear
to what extent the 1948 revision permits injunctions in circumstances
where an injunction would have been barred even before Toucey."40
Thus, the purpose and application of the statute are still in dispute.
The Supreme Court cases interpreting § 2283 since 1948 have only
obtained in the state courts. See Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891); Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
An apparent exception was a line of cases which allowed federal injunctions against relitigation
of a matter already decided in the federal court. See Looney v. Eastern Texas Ry., 247 U.S. 214
(1918); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
For the Supreme Court's treatment of these exceptions, see Toucey v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), which expressly overruled the "relitigation" exception and cast doubt
upon the other exceptions. See notes 36-38 infra and accompanying text.
36. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
37. Id. at 140-41.
38. Id. at 139-40. See note 35 supra.
39. Advisory Committee Note, reprinted following text of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The follow-
ing cases and article have cited the comment with approval: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 60 n.
3 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Atlantic C. Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
(1970); Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333, 340 (1970); Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal
Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L.
REv. 92, 100 (1966); but see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1372 at 299-300 (1971); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 179-81 (2d ed. 1970); Carey, Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal
Prosecutions, 56 MASS. L.Q. 11 (1971).
40. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS § 1372 at 300 (1968). See also Comment, Anti-Suit Injunction Between State
and Federal Courts, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,482 (1965).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/4
ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE
stimulated the controversy over the scope of the statute. In
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Brothers
Co.,4 the court refused to grant a labor union's petition for an injunc-
tion against an employer's suit in the state court even though the union
conduct in controversy was subject to the exclusive authority of the
Labor Management Relations Act and therefore outside of the state's
authority. Justice Frankfurter reiterated the position he articulated in
Toucey that in § 2283 "Congress made clear beyond cavil that the
prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation ...
Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified
only by specifically defined exceptions. ' 42 Thus the indication was clear
that the judiciary was not to carve out any additional exceptions even
under the revised statute. Despite this apparent prohibition, the Court,
with Justice Frankfurter again writing the opinion, formulated another
exception to § 2283 two years later in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United
States.43 The court held that § 2283 was inapplicable to stays sought by
the United States and emphasized the frustration to national interests
which would result if the rule were otherwise:
• ..the frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from
precluding the federal government from obtaining a stay of state court
proceedings except under the severe restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283
would be so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to
Congress from the general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 alone.4
Finally, in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers,4" a case involving a federal court injunction to stay a
previous state court injunction prohibiting union picketing, the Court
again reversed its position. It rejected the principle that § 2283 was only
an act of comity and reiterated its statement in Amalgamated that there
are to be no exceptions unless "based on one of the specific statutory
exceptions to § 2283. '"4 Thus the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
the anti-injunction statute are conflicting and offer little guidance in the
41. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
42. Id. at 514.
43. 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
44. Id. at 226.
45. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
46. Id. at 287.
Vol. 1971: 625]
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determination of whether § 1983 is an exception expressly authorized
by Congress.
In the lower courts, the Fourth and Seventh circuits have held that
§ 1983 is not an express exception to § 2283, while the Third, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits have held that it is." The leading case to adopt the former
position is Baines v. City of Danville." The Negro petitioners sought to
enjoin pending criminal proceedings in the state court, alleging the state
court injunction and the city ordinances under which they were prose-
cuted were unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit applied the comity doc-
trine and recognized that a defendant in a state prosecution will receive
an adequate hearing in that forum on his federal constitutional claims.
The court indicated that to allow federal intervention is to needlessly
generate federal-state friction. 4 The Baines court also found that the
exceptions currently recognized are authorized either expressly or at
least implicitly, whereas § 1983 "creates a federal cause of action, but
with no suggestion, explicit or implicit, that appropriate relief shall
include an injunction which another Act of Congress forbids.""0 The
47. The Fourth and Seventh circuits have held that § 1983 is not an express exception to
§ 2283. Fourth Circuit: Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cerl. denied, 381
U.S. 939 (1965). Seventh Circuit: Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1963); Wojcik v.
Palmer, 318 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963); Smith v. City of Lansing,
241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957); Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 714 (N.D.
II. 1960). See also Island Steamship Lines, Inc. v. Glennon, 178 F. Supp. 292, 295 (D. Mass. 1959).
The Third, Fifth and Sixth circuits have held that § 1983 is an express exception to § 2283. Third
Circuit: Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1950); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v.
Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957). Fifth Circuit: Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th
Cir. 1969); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226,
232 (5th Cir. 1965); Duke v. Texas, 327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 1971); Carmichael v. Allen, 267
F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966). Sixth Circuit:
Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970). See also Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200
(N.D. I11. 1968), rev'd sub. nom., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); but see Cameron v. John-
son, 262 F. Supp. 873, 878 (S.D. Miss. 1966), affd, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
48. 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1963).
49. Id. at 589. See also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). The Supreme Court has
stated: "To permit the federal courts to interfere, as a matter of judicial notions of policy, may
add to the number of courts which pass on a controversy before the rightful forum for its settlement
is established. . . .There may also be added an element of federal-state competition and conflict
which may be trusted to be exploited and to complicate, not simplify, existing difficulties." Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 519 (1955). But see
Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1971) (stating that when state proceedings are instituted
in bad faith, ". . .the very concept of federalism has eroded. To enjoin the proceedings at that
point, rather than permit state courts to be used as instrumentalities for the suppression of unpopu-
lar ideas, would minimize existing federal-state friction, not 'needlessly' generate it.)" at 343.
50. 337 F.2d at 589.
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court concluded that "unless the later statute [§ 1983] contains, or
carries with it, strong evidence of an intention to repeal the earlier
[§ 2283] or to carve out an exception from it, a court's duty is to
harmonize the two."51 The court harmonized the two statutes by finding
no compelling reason to ignore the congressional command of non-
intervention contained in § 2283.52 This rationale, then, gives effect to
the language of § 2283 and is based on the theory that had Congress
intended to make § 1983 an exception to the anti-injunction statute, it
would have done so through express language as it had done with other
recognized exceptions."3
Several months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Younger, the
Sixth Circuit in Honey v. Goodman held that § 1983 is an express
exception to the anti-injunction statute. Honey is the most significant
case taking this position, not only for the court's responses to the tradi-
tional arguments in opposition to its holding, but also because it recog-
nizes certain important policies which are relevant to the proper con-
struction of the two statutes.
Plaintiffs in Honey were members of the Kentucky Chapter of the
Southern Committee Against Repression and were charged with em-
bracery55 for mailing letters to area residents protesting the transfer of
5 1. Id. at 590-91.
52. Accord: "It is . . . difficult to see why the right of an individual to test the constitutionality
of a state law by a suit in the federal court-a right which he possesses only by virtue of the
provisions of the federal statutes should be deemed to be more sacred than the right of a state to
have the action of its courts freed from restraint by a federal court injunction-a right which it
also possesses only by virtue of a federal statute . . . Such a doctrine . . . clearly violates the
spirit and theory which inspired the Act of 1793 and . . . evaluates the right of an individual to
resort to the federal court more highly than the right of a state to resort to its own courts." Warren,
Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REv. 345, 375 (1930). But see note 53 infra.
53. But see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 62 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting): "There is no
more good reason for allowing a general statute dealing with federalism passed at the end of the
18th century [§ 2283] to control another statute [§1983] also dealing with federalism, passed
almost 80 years later, than to conclude that the early concepts of federalism were not changed by
the Civil War."
54. 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970).
55. The common law offense of embracery has been defined in Brown v. Beauchamp, 21 Ky.
L.R. 268, 269 (1827): [W]here one attempts to corrupt, or influence, or instruct ajury, or any way
to incline them to be more favorable to the one side or the other, by money, letters, promises,
threats, or persuasions, except only by the strength of evidence, and the arguments of counsel in
open court at the trial of the cause. ... In Commonwealth v. Denny, 235 Ky. 588, 31 S.W.2d
940 (1930), the definition was expanded by including in the word "jury" those persons who have
been selected for jury duty although not necessarily impaneled or sworn to serve on any particular
case.
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a trial arising out of Louisville's civil disorders. Plaintiffs filed suit in
federal court requesting the convocation of a three-judge panel to issue
a declaratory judgment with respect to the constitutionality of the em-
bracery statute'and to enjoin the pending prosecution in the state court! 6
The complaint alleged that the embracery statute was unconstitutional
on its face and as applied and that the prosecutions were instituted in
bad faith. The district court held that the anti-injunction statute prohib-
ited the court from issuing the relief prayed for and dismissed.57 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the anti-injunction
statute does not bar relief in first amendment cases if the prosecution
complained of is instituted in bad faith and has a chilling effect on first
amendment rights.58
The court, in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate in
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,59 found § 2283 to be more than "a mere
principle of comity", but nevertheless held that the statute could be
avoided when the "highly unusual and very limited circumstances" of
Dombrowski v. Pfister are proved."° Thus the court decided that § 1983
is an "exception expressly authorized by an Act of Congress" only in
certain exigent circumstances. The court justified this result by using the
56. The convocation of the three-judge district court to rule on the constitutionality of the
embracery offense was sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 & 2284 (1970); the injunction was sought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), for which jurisdiction was invoked in the district court under 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) & (4) (1970).
57. Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1970).
58. Id. The court found the common law offense to be constitutional on its face and thus upheld
the district court's refusal to convene a three-judge panel on that issue.
The petitioners contended that they were being punished for their expression of controversial
ideas in a manner akin to "pure speech." The court relied on Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919) and Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), to hold that a state has the right to
regulate pure speech when used to create a clear and present danger of substantive evils that the
states have a right to prevent, one of these evils being the threat to the administration of justice.
432 F.2d 333, 338.
The necessity for a hearing by the federal district court was eliminated by an agreement entered
into by the parties dismissing both the criminal action in the state court and the § 1983 action in
the district court. Letter on File, Washington University Law Quarterly.
Before the decision in Honey, the courts in the Sixth Circuit were in conflict; compare Armstrong
v. Ellington, 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) and Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D.
Tenn. 1967), aff'd mem., 391 U.S. 361 (1968); with Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky.
1967).
59. See notes 45 and 46 supra and accompanying text.
60. 432 F.2d at 343. Honey breaks the bad faith test down into several elements: (1) selective
enforcement of a statute, (2) with no real hope of ultimate success, (3) for the sole purpose of
punishing the defendants, and (4) discouraging others from exercising their freedom of speech. Id.
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Supreme Court's rationale in Leiter Minerals"1 that § 2283 is inapplic-
able if its effect would be to frustrate a superior federal interest. The
superior federal interest to be protected in this situation is the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. When a Dombrowski-type
situation is present, "the frustration of superior federal interests that
would ensue from precluding an aggrieved citizen from obtaining a stay
of state court proceedings would be so great as to pose a threat of
irreparable injury to a national interest."' 2
The Honey court emphasized the infirmities of a result which would
grant relief when a prosecution was threatened, but would deny relief if
the prosecution was pending.6 This distinction has been criticized as
creating a "race between the prosecutor and his intended victims to the
state and federal courthouse respectively, with the victor getting all the
'spoils'."' In addition, such a distinction does not take into account
that rarely, if ever, does a prosecutor announce in advance his plans to
prosecute.65
6 1. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. For another case using this rationale, see Sheridan
v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969).
62. 432 F.2d at 343. Judge Kalbfleish concurred in the result, preferring to rely on the 1965
decision in Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), wherein the Supreme Court remanded a case
to be reconsidered in light of Dombrowski and instructed the lower court to decide whether § 2283
barred relief; see note 95 infra. Judge O'Sullivan dissented, regarding § 2283 as an "absolute
prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings unless the injunction falls within one of the
three specifically defined exceptions." Id. at 346.
63. The determination of whether a particular prosecution is threatened or pending may create
additional problems for one seeking federal intervention. See Carey, Federal Court Intervention in
State Criminal Prosecution, 56 MASS. L.Q. 11, 42 (1971).
The Supreme Court in Dombrowski pointed out that since the grand jury had not yet convened
and indictments had not been issued before the filing of the complaint, no state proceedings were
instituted within the meaning of § 2283. In addition, indictments issued and currently pending did
not invoke § 2283 because the sole reason the indictments were obtained was the erroneous dis-
missal of the temporary restraining order by the district court. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 484 n. 2 (1965). See also Taylor v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 424 F.2d 478, 482 (6th Cir.
1970) (holding that disbarrment proceedings, prior to their adjudication in the court in which the
power to disbar resides, are not pending proceedings; therefore, the anti-injunction statute does not
apply).
64. Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 1970), citing Note, The Dombrowski
Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights,
21 RUTGERS L. Rav. 92 (1966); see also Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969); Boyer,
Federal Injunctive Relief. A Counterpoise Against the Use of State Criminal Prosecutions Designed
to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 50 (1967). The threatened-
-pending distinction has also been criticized on the ground that the amount of interference with
the sovereignity is equal in either situation. Id. at 95-96.
65. 432 F.2d at 343.
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The court also noted the scope of the jurisdiction provided for by§ 1983* and stated that § 1983 was intended to alter the balance of
power between the federal and state courts.6" The basis of this rationale
is that the statute was passed by a Reconstruction Congress and "its
very purpose was to protect the rights of freedmen against abusive Con-
duct of state officials. '6 7 Section 1983 was thus intended to increase the
duty and power of the federal court in protecting constitutional rights
and to ". . . escape from that duty is not permissable merely because
state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal
courts .. ."6 Contrary to Baines, the court was not swayed by the
lack of any reference to § 2283 or to some type of "proceeding" in the
various provisions of § 1983, but found that the purpose of § 1983 as
stated above precludes the applicability of the anti-injunction statute.
While Judge Celebreeze, speaking for the majority, did not explicitly
compare § 1983 to the six generally recognized statutory exceptions,
other writers have done so in an effort to demonstrate that the considera-
tions which led to establishing these statutes as exceptions apply to
§ 1983 as well.69 It is true, as Professor Wright observes, that, in con-
trast to § 1983, the six statutes all contain provisions which clearly
allow the federal government and/or private parties to enjoin other
"proceedings. ' 70 However, this analysis seems deficient for three rea-
sons: (1) it does not consider the judicially created exceptions prior to
Toucey;71 (2) it does not consider the 1948 statute which provides for
exceptions which do not fit squarely with those which existed prior to
66. Id. at 342.
67. Id.
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right
in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise,
state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by
the state agencies.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967); MeNeese v. Board of
Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Taylor v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 424 F.2d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 1970).
See also Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1352 (1970).
68. 432 F.2d at 342, quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,248 (1967).
69. E.g., Note, Incompatability-The Touchstone of Section 2283's Express Authorization
Exception, 50 VA. L. REv. 1404 (1964); Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions
Against State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 92
(1966).
70. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 141, 181 (2d ed. 1970).
71. See notes 31 & 35 supra and accompanying text.
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its enactment;72 and (3) it does not reflect the rationale of the Leiter
Minerals exception. 73 Some writers have attempted to isolate character-
istics common to all of the statutory exceptions. One suggested approach
has identified two such elements: (1) the exceptions are incompatible
with the anti-injunction statute, i.e. the purpose of § 2283 is contrary
to the purpose of the particular statute in question; 74 and (2) the reme-
dies provided for under these statutes would be substantially limited if
§ 2283 were held to bar their use.75 These characteristics are similarly
applicable to § 1983. Arguably the incompatibility is present because
one statute prohibits the enjoining of a state court proceeding while the
other provides for the enjoining of any unconstitutional state action,
which may include a state court proceeding. 76 The substantial lessening
of § 1983's remedy would occur because state court prosecutions are a
major vehicle whereby state officials may infringe upon constitutional
rights.
A careful analysis of the arguments advanced by the Baines and
Honey courts indicates persuasive reasoning on both sides of the issue.
A resolution of the resulting judicial conflict could depend on the policy
considerations presented by the relationship between § 1983 and
§ 2283. The Sixth Circuit, in Honey, is the first court to raise what may
be the most important policy consideration: that is, the real need for a
federal forum for individuals who believe their constitutional rights are
being violated by the conduct of state officials. 78
The argument most often put forward against the availability of a
federal forum is that the states are bound to follow the federal constitu-
72. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 43 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
74. See Note, Incompatability-The Touchstone of Section 2283"s Express Authorization
Exception, 50 VA. L. REv. 1404 (1964).
75. See Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings
Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 92, 101 (1966).
76. See Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. Rav. 726, 738
(1961).
77. See notes 89 & 91 infra; cf. United States v. Screws, 325 U.S. 91, 107-113 (1945).
78. For an earlier discussion of the policies involved, see the dissenting opinion of J. Wisdom in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964): "The main issue in this case is not, as
the majority opinion declares, 'the State's basic right of self-preservation'. No one questions this
right. The main issue is whether the State is abusing its legislative and criminal processes: whether
the State, under the pretext of protecting itself against subversion, has harassed and humiliated the
plaintiffs and is about to prosecute them solely because their activities in promoting civil rights for
Negroes conflicts with the State's steel-hard policy of segregation." Id. at 569.
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tion to the same degree as the federal courts.71 Professor Amsterdam has
set forth additional arguments for justifying state court adjudication of
constitutional claims.8 ° This procedure arguably effectuates at least four
policies of federalism: (1) the assumption by state courts of more respon-
sibility in the administration of federal law; (2) the lessening of friction
between state and federal courts; (3) the avoidance of unnecessary consti-
tutional litigation in the federal courts; and (4) the prevention of disrup-
tion of orderly state proceedings which results in confusion and uncer-
tainty in the state court process.
These policy considerations are logically sound and probably reflect
what was intended when the federal system was adopted."' However,
these policies do not reflect changes and failures in the federal-state
relationship. First, the Civil War amendments and the Reconstruction
statutes caused major changes in our federal system.1z Secondly, this
79. Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. REV. 726, 727 (1961).
"The prohibition of § 2283 is but continuing evidence of confidence in the state courts, reinforced
by a desire to avoid direct conflicts between state and federal courts. . . . We cannot assume that
this confidence has been misplaced." Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman
Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 518 (1955).
Amsterdam offers the following rebuttal to those who argue that under our federal system state
courts have the power and the ability to protect federally guaranteed rights: "True, state courts
are competent to administer federal law, and they may by self-denial act to vindicate federal
liberties. Theory casts them in this protective role, but the battle is not over theory. The battle is
for the streets, and on the streets conviction now is worth a hundred times reversal later." Amster-
dam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 801 (1965).
80. Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 828-32.
81. "It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our Federalism', born in the early struggling
days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its
future." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). The phrase "Our Federalism" was defined
earlier in the Court's opinion as ". . . a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the
fact that the entire country is made up of a union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the states and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in separate ways." Id. at 44. But see note 53 supra.
82. See U.S. CONST. amend XIII (1865), amend. XIV (1968) and amend. XV (1870); 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (enacted in 1870); § 1982 (1970) (enacted in 1866); § 1983 (1970) (enacted
in 1871); § 1985 (1970) (enacted in 1861); § 1986 (1970) (enacted in 1861); and § 1994 (1970)
(enacted in 1867). The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reflects the affirmative power of
Congress to enforce fourteenth amendment rights. This view regards § 1983 as a "civil war amend-
ment" representing a judgment by the Reconstruction Congress to upset the traditional notions of
"federalism" in order to protect many of the newly-won rights. See, e.g., Younger v: Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunction
Against State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERs L. REV. 92, 105-
18 (1966). Some writers go further and suggest that the reason federal district courts were created
in the beginning was to give citizens a forum which would not be tainted by local prejudices and
interests. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 569-83 (1964) (Wisdom, J., dissent-
ing); Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 802.
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system has been ineffective in the area of civil rights. Amsterdam has
indicated many reasons for this failure:83 local interests and prejudices
are often at cross-currents with federal constitutional law; many local
judges and officials are unfamiliar with federal law; state prosecutions
are often weighed against the defendant; "the defendant is often ex-
hausted before his remedies";" many of the prosecutions which now
pass through the state courts and then into federal courts would never
be instituted if the prosecuting attorney knew that he would have to
present his case in a federal court; and, although the state courts may
be capable of hearing the more traditional constitutional issues such as
right to counsel or right to speedy trial, the justification for allowing
states to try constitutional issues fails when "the activity underlying the
criminal prosecution is federally immune from state inhibition. '8 5
The argument that the states do not adequately protect the constitu-
tional rights of their citizens has been attacked as unsubstantiated and
unfair."' Although the allegations are difficult to verify, empirically
numerous recent occurrences indicate serious shortcomings: 87 the failure
83. Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 832-38. See also Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief. A Counter-
poise Against the Use of State Criminal Prosecutions Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred
Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51 (1967).
84. Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 834.
85. Id. at 837. Other obstacles to an adequate vindication of constitutional rights in the state
courts may be as follows: (1) if the defendant is a Negro, he is faced with juries, courtrooms, and
officials from which other Negroes have been systematically excluded; (2) even if federal rights are
ultimately vindicated, it will be a lengthy and costly experience; (3) bail must be posted at every
turn and professional bondsmen are "out" for civil rights workers in the South; (4) local prejudices
and sympathies often lead to adverse fact-finding which hurts the defendant on each appeal. Id. at
795-801.
He concludes: "Beyond these risks, these hardships, these repressions and delays, the ultimate
message of the state court process to the Negro comes through loud and clear: 'Litigation is not a
meaningful avenue to the enjoyment of federal rights.' He is no Cassandra who sees that there can
be but one response to such a message." Id. at 799; see also Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief. A
Counterpoise Against the Use of State Criminal Prosecution Designed to Deter the Exercise of
Preferred Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51 (1967).
86. Compare: "I hope we will never become so bigoted as to think that state judges are any less
devoted to the principles of the federal constitution than other judges and lawyers." Address by
Chief Justice Warren Burger, March 12, 1971, National Conference of the Judiciary, 54
JUDICATURE 410, 413 (1971), with: "I do not know that the Supreme Court of the United States
itself would be willing formally to find Mississippi justice either conspiratorial or incompetent, were
such a finding required as a condition of authorizing timely federal intervention into state criminal
prosecutions destructive of federal rights. But I do not need to try these factually and politically
untriable issues in order to conclude that in its normal processes Mississippi Justice too unbearably
clogs the freedoms indispensable to a free society." Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 800.
87. Professor Lusky has described two types of local resistance which are employed to deprive
Negroes of their constitutional rights in the South: one, which he calls the Mississippi method, is
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of local communities to comply with constitutional requirements in their
school systems;88 the stalling and harassment tactics employed by local
courts to intimidate minority groups; 9 the failure of local officials to
protect the voting rights of its citizens;9" and, the harassment and bad
faith prosecutions used against unpopular groups and persons.'
The traditional arguments against federal intervention would appear
prosecuting unpopular persons on unlawful criminal charges; the other, the Alabama method, is
withholding the protection of claimed federal rights. Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Fede-
ral Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1163, 1179-85 (1963); Professor Am-
sterdam concurs substantially in Lusky's statements and adds: "In this regard it [Mississippi
Justice] differs only in degree from the justice administered in other Southern States, and in States
outside the South." Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 800. See also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT-A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH (1965).
88. See, e.g., Green v. New Kent County School, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School
Bds., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1966); Price v. Denison Independent School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965);
Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). For more
recent developments, see NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1971 at 26.
89. Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377
U.S. 288 (1964); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
90. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Bruce, 353 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d
759 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Dogan, 314 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1963); Alabama v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962), affd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
There are indications that state intimidation and harassment still exist in 1971 against Negroes
who attempt to exercise their voting rights. One article states: "Once Blacks get to the old white
courthouse in Charleston, they are signed up fairly, because the county clerk is under federal court
orders to do just that" (emphasis added). Wall Street Journal, June 22, 1971, at 1, col. I.
91. See, e.g., City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F.
Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.Pa. 1968); see generally
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PRO-
TECTION IN THE SOUTH (1965); Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief.- A Counterpoise Against the Use
of State Criminal Prosecutions Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional Rights,
13 How L.J. 51 (1967).
The "May Day", 1971, mass arrests in Washington, D.C., see NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1971, at
24-29, present a vivid Dombrowski situation. Although Washington, D.C. is under the direct
supervision of the federal government, it is considered a "state or territory" within the meaning of
the Civil Rights Act. Sewell v. Peglow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961), citing Talbott v. Silver Bow
County, 139 U.S. 438, 444 (1891) and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); see Edwards v. Sard,
250 F. Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1966).
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to be outweighed by the recognition, underscored by the recent events
described above, that there is a need for a federal forum. In addition,
the Supreme Court in Younger has in effect supported the Honey ration-
ale in several respects. 2 First, the Court's reliance on the threatened
prosecution cases, although dealing with a pending case, supports the
soundness of the rationale that any distinction between threatened and
pending prosecution is artificial and illogical.13 Secondly, by extending
the Dombrowski bad faith test to pending prosecutions, the Court has
undercut the traditional justification for invoking § 2283: the existence
of an adequate state forum for the protection of petitioner's federal
constitutional rights. If the petitioner can satisfy the bad faith test, it
cannot be seriously argued that he will be able to properly present his
first amendment claims in state court. By meeting the test, he will have
shown: (1) that the prosecutor undertook the case knowing he had no
hope of securing a valid conviction; and (2) that the prosecution itself
was an attempt to harass the defendant and discourage the exercise of
his first amendment rights.94 In such a situation, a refusal to enjoin a
pending prosecution because of § 2283 has little justification. The peti-
92. The cases that have cited Honey to date have not diminished its significance. See Livingston
v. Garmire. 442 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1971); Major v. Ferdon, 325 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Calif. 1971);
Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
93. Although the court states that "we express no view about the circumstances under which
federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal
proceeding is begun," 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). it reasons extensively from the line of cases involving
threatened prosecutions. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S.
387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
295 U.S. 89 (1935); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Additionally, most of the cases used by the Supreme Court did not involve any first amendment
situations, thereby avoiding what the Court in Dombrowski felt especially determinative. See notes
10-14 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 216 (N.D. 111. 1968):
"Furthermore, defendant's contention here completely ignores the underlying rationale of the
Dombrowski decision. Dombrowski rests on the unstated premise that full exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms should not be substantially impaired, but rather actively encouraged, in a demo-
cratic society such as our own."
94. See note 12 supra. Sheridan v. Garrison explained the rationale that would make
Dombrowski applicable to pending prosecutions brought in bad faith: "[W]here a person threat-
ened by a bad faith prosecution that suppresses first amendment freedoms must defend the suit in
order to vindicate his rights, he has no adequate remedy at law, and the assumption underlying the
principles of comity, which is that state courts can adequately protect federal rights, consequently
disappears." 415 F.2d 699, 707 (5th Cir. 1969). The Eastern District of Texas has used the Younger
case to enjoin a pending state court injunction by finding that the underlying reason for demanding
irreparable injury before intervention is absent when the state proceeding involved is not a criminal
prosecution, either threatened or pending. Duke v. Texas, 327 F. Supp. 1218, 1233 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
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tioner's first amendment rights have already been "chilled" by the initi-
ation of the prosecution; further deprivation of these rights would appear
likely if the state were allowed to proceed. Thirdly, the Supreme Court
could have decided the Younger case by holding that § 2283 was an
absolute bar to federal intervention; this result would have rendered the
Court's determination of whether the petitioner had met the test for
intervention unnecessary. However, because the Court was extremely
careful to articulate its test for intervention against pending prosecutions
and to determine whether the petitioner had met this test, it appears that
had this test been met, § 2283 would not have been a bar. It seems
unlikely that the Court would carefully delineate the kinds of facts and
circumstances which would justify federal intervention if § 2283 would
have precluded relief regardless of the actual facts or circumstances."
Honey explicitly recognizes the need for federal relief in order to
preserve "superior federal interests"-first amendment rights. The
court has taken a logical and necessary step in holding that § 2283 is
not a bar when the requisite criteria are met. The criteria enunciated in
Younger will require a substantial burden; bad faith, frequently alleged,
is difficult to prove; the other instance, "extraordinary circum-
stances",96 may never occur. 7 Younger may have taken much of the
substance out of Dombrowski, but it has tacitly approved the Honey
rationale extending federal intervention to pending prosecutions. There
needs to be, however, a specific directive from the Supreme Court or
Congress affirming the Honey rule in order to insure adequate protec-
tion of constitutional rights.
95. The order in which the court discussed the two issues involved in pending eases takes on
added significance when one compares the approach used in Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741(1965). In that case, the Court remanded to the district court to consider first whether § 2283 bars
federal injunctive relief. "If § 2283 is not a bar, the court should then determine whether [equitable]
relief is proper. ... Id. In reversing the order in which the issues are to be considered, the Court
in Younger has indicated the approach to be used in the future by the lower federal courts. The
cases decided post-Younger indicate the Court's directive is being followed. See, e.g., Livingston v.
Garmire, 442 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1971).
96. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
97. One writer has expressed in the following manner the difficulty which will be encountered in
meeting this "extra ordinary circumstances" test: "A statute providing that any defense attorney
who objects to the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecutor shall be summarily held in
contempt and taken from the courtroom to be hanged might meet the test, assuming that 'Due
Process' and 'Cruel and Unusual Punishment' are sufficiently express constitutional prohibitions."
Carey, Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Prosecutions, 56 MASS. L.Q. 11, 45 n. 49
(1971).
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